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‘UhuRuto’ and other Leviathans: 







The International Criminal Court’s intervention in Kenya emerged from a complex and 
contested political history, with different actors advocating for domestic solutions and 
others arguing for an international legal process in The Hague. Earlier positions have 
been disavowed and others have changed in the dynamic Kenyan political environment. 
The ICC intervention has produced a number of political effects, including the 
imbrication of the ICC process with electoral politics. This article takes up the case study 
of the Kenyan situation as a site of political contestation mediated through legal discourse. 
It considers these dynamics on two registers: at the geopolitical level (considering the 
relationships between the ICC, the African Union, and the United Nations Security 
Council) as well as at the domestic level (both state and civil society). By tracing the 
discourses through which these contestations transpire, this article highlights some of the 
themes, strategies, and practices through which the ICC’s intervention has been received. 
 
 
1. Geographies of Justice 
 
Italian philosopher Roberto Esposito has argued that ‘the domain of law is gaining terrain 
both domestically and internationally’; he continued, ‘the process of normativisation is 
investing increasingly wider spaces’.1 As the introduction to this issue maintains, this 
(legal) domain carries with it a particular ontology that is reinforced through its increased 
uptake by actors at the domestic and international levels in response to mass atrocity. 
When acts of violence are described as crimes, this designation carries a set of 
assumptions about agency, responsibility, and appropriate forms for redressing suffering. 
As more terrain is captured for law and subjected to its particular logics – especially legal 
ontologies that focus on retributive forms – other ways of conceptualising responses to 
conflict are sidelined or considered inadequate when measured against its dominant 
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  As the field of international criminal law expanded in the post-Cold War period, 
it presented a contrasting paradigm to negotiated political settlements and truth 
commissions.
3
 Its focus on individualised responsibility for mass crimes reflects liberal 
legalist understandings of how causality operates in conflict settings; here the Nuremberg 
tribunal’s famous assertion that crimes are committed by ‘men, not by abstract entities’ is 
one of the underlying premises of the field.
4
 The spread of international criminal law has 
produced unprecedented forms of what one diplomatic proponent of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) has termed ‘international judicial intervention’.5 The ICC Rome 
Statute’s preamble claims that ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole must not go unpunished’, suggesting that ‘ending impunity’ ought 




The terms through which international criminal law operates suggest that the field works 
through cosmopolitan and apolitical consensus, unified by a collective desire to bring 
what Walter Benjamin calls ‘the great criminal’ before the law, a figure whose violence 
is seen to threaten the very foundations of the legal order.
7
  The field presents the 
international community as the agent of these interventions, though this ‘imagined 
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community’8 is a rhetorical construct rather than a determinate body of states. Invoking 
the international community as its agent is meant to imbue the ICC’s actions with moral 
force and political legitimacy. International judicial interventions are thought to be 
undertaken on behalf of a cosmopolitan constituency and in the interest of the global 
good rather than reflecting the interests of particular political actors. As prosecutors at the 
ICC have repeatedly emphasised, they are ‘solely guided by the law’ 9 ; the current 
prosecutor contended that ‘politics have no place and will play no part in the decisions I 
take’.10 
 
The theoretical construction of international criminal law as a collective project of the 
international community, devoid of political interests and embracing the moral call to 
‘end impunity’, contrasts with the field’s work in practice. Translated into practice, 
international criminal law is selectively enforced; whether they directly address it or not, 
international prosecutors often consider political factors such as prospects for state 
cooperation when they exercise their discretionary power. Limits posed by state 
sovereignty, disputes concerning venue – national or international – and financial 
considerations ensure that international criminal trials are unusual events, whether at ad 
hoc tribunals such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone or before the permanent ICC. 
To date, international judicial interventions have overwhelmingly occurred in the global 
South.
11
 As of the time of writing, all suspects before the ICC have been from the African 
continent. Meanwhile, the court has not asserted jurisdiction over violations of 
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international criminal law allegedly committed in Palestine, leading some observers to 
contend that what the court frames as a technical jurisdictional matter is also a product of 
the political interests of strong states.
12
 The United Nations Security Council features 
prominently in the production of these geographies, whether through founding tribunals 
(as was the case with Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia) or through triggering the 
referral of a situation to the ICC through a resolution. The concerns of the permanent five 
members of the Security Council are reflected in the map of international judicial 




Against this backdrop of selective geographies, international judicial interventions have 
produced considerable resistance from states and regional bodies, particularly on the 
African continent.
14
 These interventions have also produced claims that the field of 
international criminal law is either inherently political or has been politicised in practice. 
Resistance to the ICC has been mobilised around assertions of sovereignty, not only 
because sovereignty serves as a foundational value of the international legal order but 
also due to its historical significance for postcolonial states.
15
 Critics of the court’s 
exercise of jurisdiction draw further support from its selective interventions. Whether the 
ICC’s intervention takes place in a state which has consented to its founding treaty (as 
with Kenya) or not (as with Sudan), the court’s selective geography is invoked to 
reinforce claims that the ICC serves the interests of strong states. Under what conditions 
and by whom is the decision to intervene taken? As all three triggers of the ICC’s 
jurisdiction have shown – whether state (self) referral, the prosecutor’s own initiation 
(proprio motu), or through a UN Security Council resolution – the court’s actions are not 
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only determined by the imperative to prosecute ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community’ but also by issues of political will, state cooperation, and 




At stake then is not whether the field can be separated from ‘the political’, understood 
here as the powers and interests that invest and shape social interactions. In this sense, 
and contrasting sharply with assertions by the field’s proponents that ‘politics have no 
place’ within it, the legal domain is another site of political contestation. This article 
considers the ways in which powers and interests are channeled, disavowed, and 
contested by different actors, often through appropriating the very terms of the field and 
its corresponding ontologies. Such critiques of international criminal law have emerged 
in scholarship on the ICC and other tribunals, with Gerry Simpson’s notion of ‘juridified 
diplomacy’ offering one theorisation of the field’s relation to the political. 17  Kamari 
Clarke’s 2009 Fictions of Justice served as a pioneering monograph in offering an 
empirically grounded critique of the field and its presumptions.
18
 Sarah Nouwen and 
Wouter Werner have explored the political dimensions of ICC interventions in Uganda 
and Darfur, arguing that ‘international criminal justice has become a weapon in struggles 
in Uganda and Sudan’ while ‘the ICC has become implicated in the distinction, and thus 
construction, of friends (allies) and enemies.’ 19  While a contentious claim to many 
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proponents of these courts, this diagnosis may in fact be bound up with the very idea of 
‘international judicial interventions’:  by intervening in complex conflict and post-
conflict political settings, international criminal courts and tribunals become political 
agents themselves, in the sense that they form alliances with some actors (often states, 
whose support they rely upon) and designate others as alleged criminals, producing 
domestic political effects. In the Kenyan context, Mahmood Mamdani has observed that 
the ICC intervention has polarised domestic politics through re-ethnicising communities 
and criminalising one side of the conflict.
20
 Powers and interests are routed through court 
interventions: new categories of identity are generated through distinguishing between 
‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ of the international community, and old (colonial) forms of 
identity are reinscribed through how conflict narratives are recounted in the terms of 
international criminal law. 
 
The mythology of an apolitical international criminal law, with its body of jurisprudence 
that seeks to distill individual criminal acts from complex conflicts, is increasingly 
contested by work that places its practices in political and cultural context. This article 
builds upon this strand of critical legal scholarship by focusing on what is produced – 
politically and discursively – through international judicial interventions. It takes up the 
ICC’s engagement in Kenya as a case study of the court’s power to produce identities and 
narratives that in turn yield new sites of political contestation. 
 
The Kenyan intervention has contributed to recalibrations of the domestic political field, 
unifying formerly opposed groups of the electorate and deepening the rift between the 
Kenyan state and domestic civil society organisations. There has been a long history of 
shifting alliances among political elites in post-independence Kenya, yet the ICC’s 
intervention has polarised Kenyan politics in new ways. While the formation of an 
alliance between past political rivals may have contributed to a peaceful election in 2013, 
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this was tenuously based upon a shared enemy, the ICC, while the structural bases of past 
violence remain unaddressed.
21
 In addition to providing a much welcomed venue for 
pursuing accountability through legal forms, the ICC’s intervention has also resulted in 
security threats to ICC witnesses, conflict-affected communities, and civil society 
organisations who support the court’s work.22 Regionally it has mobilised opposition 
from the African Union and led to UN Security Council involvement through the Kenyan 
government’s request for a deferral under Article 16 of the Rome Statute.23 The Kenyan 
situation before the ICC thus illustrates how tensions between different political actors 
play out in relation to the court’s work, with implications for how the court is perceived 
on the sole continent where it has brought cases.  
 
2. Producing ‘UhuRuto’ 
 
The mass violence during and following Kenya’s disputed 2007 election was not without 
precedent in a country that had moved from colonial oversight to a long period of one 
party rule.
24
 Political rivalries established through the anticolonial struggle and during the 
period of early state formation resurfaced, sometimes in new configurations and alliances, 
in electoral cycles throughout Kenya’s recent history. Multi-party elections conducted in 
1992 and 1996 had led to political violence between rival factions. However, the 
2007/2008 post-election violence – resulting in the loss of over one thousand lives and 
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the displacement of large sections of the Kenyan population – prompted substantial 




The African Union engaged with Kenyan political actors in the early aftermath of the 
post-election violence. The AU Panel of Eminent African Personalities, chaired by 
former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, oversaw a political settlement reached 
through the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) process that began in 
late January 2008.  The KNDR led to the signing of a National Accord and 
Reconciliation agreement on 28 February 2008, which established a four-part agenda to 
address the consequences of the post-election violence. A coalition government was 
established with electoral rivals Mwai Kibaki of the Party of National Unity (PNU) and 
Raila Odinga of the rival Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) as President and Prime 
Minister. The Accord also led to a Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence 
(‘CIPEV’ or the ‘Waki Commission’), which issued a report in October 2008 
recommending the establishment of a special tribunal to try those responsible for 
orchestrating the violence.
26
 The Commission forwarded an envelope containing the 
names of suspected perpetrators to Kofi Annan, then head of the Panel of Eminent 
African Personalities, to be forwarded to the ICC in the event that a special tribunal was 
not set up. Three attempts to develop a bill for a tribunal did not garner sufficient support 
to pass in the Kenyan parliament.
27
 After diplomatic efforts failed to yield a referral of 
the situation from the Kenyan government, the ICC Prosecutor sought to initiate 
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in Kenya’ (2013) <http://kptj.africog.org/securing-justice-establishing-a-domestic-mechanism-for-the-
2007-8-post-election-violence-in-kenya/> accessed 18 June 2014. 
 9 
investigations proprio motu under Article 15 of the Rome Statute in November of 2009.
28
 
At the end of March 2010, the ICC’s Pre-trial Chamber authorised the Prosecutor to 
begin an investigation.
29
 Six individuals, equally divided between the PNU and ODM, 
were summoned to appear in The Hague in March 2011. Charges were confirmed against 
four of the six, still equally divided between political parties, and were subsequently 
dropped against Francis Muthaura, the former head of the civil service for the PNU. 
Charges were not confirmed against the former police commissioner for incidents of 
police violence, producing a lingering sense of impunity for the acts of state security 
services despite efforts to bring domestic cases by Kenyan civil society organisations. 
 
At the time of the 2007 election, the two most prominent politicians among the indictees 
– Uhuru Kenyatta, current President of Kenya, and William Ruto, the current Deputy 
President – were rival members of opposing parties. After withdrawing from the 
presidential race on the Kenya African National Union (KANU) ticket, Kenyatta had 
backed Mwai Kibaki of the PNU; meanwhile previous KANU member Ruto supported 
Raila Odinga and the ODM in the 2007 election cycle. During the post-election violence 
attacks were allegedly carried out against perceived PNU supporters, including many 
members of the Kikuyu community. Retaliatory attacks were allegedly carried out against 
perceived ODM supporters, including members of the Kalenjin, Luo and Luhya 
communities. During the 2007 election Kenyatta and Ruto were positioned both 
politically and ethnically as members of rival communities, yet in the 2013 election cycle 
they aligned as members of the Jubilee coalition. Many popular accounts assert a causal 
relationship between the ICC cases and this dramatic reconfiguration of the political field. 
 
In the Kenyan situation, the ICC intervention thus became deeply imbricated with the 
domestic electoral process. Kenyatta and Ruto are both accused of having orchestrated 
crimes against humanity - including murder, deportation and persecution - directed at 
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each other’s respective communities, the Kikuyus and the Kalenjins. 30  The alliance 
between the politicians and their communities was forged in the period after they were 
identified as subjects of the ICC investigation. Relations improved between these former 
political rivals in early 2011, about a month after the Prosecutor announced summonses 
for the six suspects.
31
 Members of the Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities who had held 
antagonistic positions following the 2007 election jointly attended rallies as a working 
relationship developed between Kenyatta, Ruto, and then Vice President Kalonzo 
Musyoka, which was referred to as the ‘KKK alliance’ (Kikuyu, Kalenjin and Kamba) by 
its detractors.
32
 During this period, Musyoka undertook diplomatic trips to try to convince 
members of the African Union to support a Kenyan request to defer the situation under 
Article 16 of the Rome Statute.
33
 Ruto left the ODM to join an affiliated party, which he 
eventually left in January 2012 in order to launch a new party, the United Republican 
Party (URP). Meanwhile Kenyatta left the PNU and affiliated with The National Alliance 
(TNA), a previously defunct party that had been re-registered in 2008. Months before the 
alliance between Uhuru and Ruto was formally announced, a civil society representative 
from an organisation based in the Rift Valley noted that the two communities of 
presidential aspirants who had been taken to The Hague were coming together.
34
 At the 
elite level, the ICC intervention appeared to be reuniting conservative forces from the 
former ruling party KANU.
35
 Kenyatta’s TNA and Ruto’s URP signed a pre-election 
alliance agreement stipulating that Kenyatta would run for president with Ruto as his 
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deputy. They formed the Jubilee coalition in early December 2012, about three months 
before the election, which they symbolically enacted at a campaign rally through 
exchanging baseball caps from the other’s respective party. In the space of roughly two 
years, these former rivals and their communities who had been violently opposed in the 
past appeared to have moved from antagonism to cooperation. As a civil society 
representative characterised it, ‘two major antagonistic tribes – Kikuyu and Kalenjin – 
were united through the elections’.36  
 
This imbrication of the ICC process and the election was represented through the figure 
of ‘UhuRuto’, which came to dominate the Nairobi skyline in the months preceding the 
March 2013 election. It appeared on posters covering freeway overpasses, underpasses, 
walls, and buildings. ‘UhuRuto’ permeated the Kenyan landscape, either as the term 
alone or accompanied by the two smiling politicians. But the term was much greater than 
the amalgamation of the two names would suggest. The Jubilee coalition’s advertising 
campaign merged Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto into a composite, a unity forged 
from out of past enmity in the 2007 election cycle. The figure was meant to stand for the 
melding of two previously opposed communities, who were to abandon their grievances 
in the symbolic reconciliation embodied in ‘UhuRuto’ and the Jubilee coalition. 
 
This narrative of unity from out of enmity was reflected in popular discourse. Newspaper 
accounts attributed the court with a causal power, suggesting that the ICC process had 
produced the political alliance. As early as July 2012, one paper reported that the election 
was being recast as a ‘referendum on the Kenya cases’,37 which one observer noted was 
part of the campaign platform of the nascent Jubilee alliance toward the end of 2012.
38
 
Headlines at that time announced that the ICC created a ‘Coalition of the Accused’.39 
According to one journalistic account, the coalition ‘coalesced around the perceived 
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(Nairobi 28 June 2013), author’s notes. 
37
 A Ndegwa, ‘Campaign themes shape up as hopefuls scramble for numbers’ The Standard (Nairobi 22 
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persecution of its leaders by the much-vilified ICC’.40 A representative of a Northern 
donor state described this recalibration of the political field as ‘an almost contradictory 
situation’ where communities previously opposed to each other were brought into an 
alliance by political leaders ‘to propagate impunity.’41 A prominent Kenyan academic 
expressed a similar position: ‘[Kenyatta and Ruto] have been so preoccupied with ICC 
that they finally settled on running for the leadership of the country, probably to fight 
from a position of advantage’.42 Jubilee supporters interpreted the ICC intervention as 
persecution of their communities; meanwhile, supporters of the Court process regarded 
the political realignment as an effort to escape legal accountability. In both instances, the 
ICC was attributed with causing this shift in the domestic political landscape. 
 
Voting choices for the 2013 election were also re-cast in relation to the ICC.  Some 
commentators in the Daily Nation argued that ‘[w]hile the Jubilee team had vowed to 
make the election a referendum on the case at the ICC, their opponents hoped to use it as 
a campaign tool against the Uhuru-Ruto ticket.’43 Uhuru and Ruto’s public statements 
suggest that voting for them could be construed as a rejection of the ICC: one 
commentator claimed ‘Uhuru said, “A vote for us is a vote of no confidence in the ICC.”  
Ruto said, “Presidential victory for the Jubilee Alliance may indicate there is something 
wrong with the charges its two leaders are facing at The Hague”’.44 Following their 
election victory, the Daily Nation reported that ‘[i]t is noteworthy that it is the ICC case 
which formed the basis for the union between Mr Kenyatta and Mr Ruto which would 
later be built into a formidable political juggernaut.’45 Mahmood Mamdani has claimed 
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that the Jubilee coalition’s victory at the polls stemmed from its successful presentation 





Even civil society organisations working in the interests of the court – assisting with its 
outreach efforts or helping to identify and register potential victim participants – noted 
the polarising effect of the ICC’s work in Kenya. A member of a civil society 
organisation operating in Kenya’s Western district claimed ‘the ICC process created 
some kind of negative ethnicity that has been politicised at the expense of peace and 
justice.’47 A representative of an organisation working in the Rift Valley explained that 
the ICC was not perceived well in the region; it was regarded as a betrayal of other 
communities by the Luos ‘in the ODM pentagon.’48 Resistance to the ICC intervention 
thus provided a common, external enemy against which the figure of ‘UhuRuto’ – and 
the reconciled communities that it was thought to stand for – could then define 
themselves as part of a common Kenyan nation.  
 
3. Sovereignty and State Strategy 
 
At the domestic level, the ICC intervention in Kenya contributed to a political 
realignment that forged a unity from out of past enemies.
49
 Viewed from the standpoint 
of the ICC and its proponents, however, the electoral success of the Jubilee Alliance 
meant that alleged perpetrators of international crimes became the apex of the Kenyan 
executive. This was coupled with the attendant fear that Kenya – a major African power, 
trading partner, and ally in regional counter-terrorism – could be perceived as a ‘rogue 
state’ headed by alleged perpetrators of grave crimes. States parties to the Rome Statute 
treaty struggled to form policy responses that would allow them to distance themselves 
from the new Kenyan leadership while maintaining economic links to the country. 
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 Interview with civil society representative (Eldoret 1 August 2012). 
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 As noted above, such alignments and realignments were not unprecented in recent Kenyan political 
history. For example, the two main contenders for the 2007 election, Odinga and Kibaki, had been aligned 
in the 2002 election cycle under the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). 
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Meanwhile, the Jubilee alliance government offered regular official reassurance of 
cooperation with the ICC while antipathy was displaced to other fronts, including before 




The political contestations that played out at the Assembly of States Parties annual 
meeting in November 2013, where the Kenyan state overtly criticised how the Rome 
Statute system was being applied in practice, represented a high point of international 
tension around the court’s interventions, involving regional actors such as the AU and 
reflecting a polarisation among ICC states parties. Tensions were further compounded by 
AU-backed Kenyan efforts to seek a deferral before the Security Council under Article 
16. However, domestic resistance to the ICC had predated the court’s intervention in 
Kenya and the high politics at stake before the AU and the Security Council. Writing in 
2009, before the ICC prosecutor officially sought to intervene, Kenyan legal scholar 
Godfrey Musila observed that ‘[m]embers of government in Kenya have evoked 
questions of autonomy and ownership in a bid to keep the ICC at bay’.51 Kenya hosted 
Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir at the signing ceremony for the new Kenyan 
Constitution in August of 2010 without executing the warrant for his arrest, which the 
court claimed was in violation of Kenya’s obligations as a state party. In December of 
2010 the Kenyan parliament passed a non-binding motion calling for the country’s 
withdrawal from the Rome Statute, which was rejected by the executive. Although the 
African Union did not endorse withdrawal from the ICC at its January 2011 summit, the 
regional body supported Kenya’s attempt to challenge the admissibility of the cases under 
Article 19 in March of 2011. During this period the Kenyan government also filed a 
request for assistance and cooperation from the ICC on the grounds that it was 
‘conducting an investigation at all levels in respect of all persons against whom there may 
                                                        
50
 For example, at the 2013 Assembly of States Parties meeting, the Kenyan Secretary for Foreign Affairs 
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be allegations of participation in Post-Election Violence’, where it emphasised that ‘it has 
at all times fully co-operated’ with requests from the Court.52 
 
The ICC dismissed the government’s admissibility challenge in May 2011 on grounds 
that the evidence did not demonstrate that the government of Kenya was taking concrete 
steps to investigate the suspects.
53
 In 2012, President Kibaki requested the Attorney 
General to establish a ‘Working Committee on the International Criminal Court’, which 
was mandated to review the confirmation of charges decisions and advise the government 
on what legal measures to take arising from the decision and to advise the government on 
its legal obligations and rights under the Rome Statute and Kenyan law. The Committee 
presented its report in March 2012, where it claimed that the Kenyan government had 
‘cooperated substantially’ with ICC investigations and complied with requests from the 
ICC, whereas the court had not responded to Kenyan requests for assistance in its 
national investigations.
54
 The Kenyan government’s efforts to have the ICC dismiss or 
defer the cases are extensively documented elsewhere
55
; for the purposes of this article I 
primarily intend to highlight these ongoing tensions between cooperation and 
contestation in the Kenyan state’s relationship to the ICC. 
 
In addition to government efforts to resist ICC jurisdiction, there has been considerable 
regional and international involvement in response to the court’s intervention in Kenya. 
The genealogy of United Nations and African Union engagement with the Kenyan 
situation extends back to the period in which the alleged crimes were committed.
56
 As 
discussed above, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and an African Union-
appointed Panel of Eminent African Personalities brokered the political settlement under 
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the February 2008 Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) process. The 
Kenyan government has repeatedly sought support from the AU and an audience before 
the Security Council to defer the cases under the authority of Article 16 of the Rome 
Statute. In a March 2011 letter, a Kenyan representative attempted to reassure the 
Security Council that both sides of the coalition government supported the deferral 
request following a decision by the ODM party ‘to push for the International Criminal 
Court cases relating to Kenya to be handled locally through a credible local 
mechanism.’57  In April 2011, UN Security Council members met regarding Kenya’s 
request to defer under Article 16 of the Rome Statute, which was subsequently rejected. 
The Working Committee on the ICC advised the Kenyan government against a further 
application to the UN for deferral under Article 16, noting that to be successful an 
application would have to show that the prosecution of the cases before the ICC would 




Kenyatta and Ruto were summoned to appear before the ICC long before they were 
elected to executive positions in March 2013. This formal shift in their political 
subjectivity mobilised further resistance to the work of the ICC on the African continent. 
In May 2013, the African Union resolved to support efforts to try the Kenyan cases 
domestically.
59
 In August 2013 an AU delegation led by the Ethiopian foreign minister 
delivered a letter to the ICC President asking for the ICC Assembly of States Parties to 
consider transferring the cases to the Kenyan national jurisdiction.
60
 AU chairpersons 
sent two letters to the ICC in July and September 2013 requesting a ‘referral’ of the ICC 
                                                        
57
 ‘Letter dated 23 March 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Kenya to the United Nations 
addressed to the President of the Security Council – Request of Kenya for deferral under article 16 of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’ (29 March 2011) UN Doc S/2011/201. 
58
 Report of Government’s Working Committee (n 54).  
59
 ‘Decision on International Jurisdiction, Justice and the International Criminal Court (ICC)’ (26-27 May 
2013) Assembly/AU/Dec. 482 (XXI) 
<http://iccnow.org/documents/AU_decisions_21st_summit_May_2013.pdf> accessed 18 June 2014. The 
text states that the AU ‘SUPPORTS AND ENDORSES the Eastern Africa Region’s request for a referral of 
the ICC investigations and prosecutions in relation to the 2007 post-election violence in Kenya, in line with 
the principle of complementarity, to allow for a National Mechanism to investigate and prosecute the cases 
under a reformed Judiciary provided for in the new constitutional dispensation, in support of the ongoing 
peace building and national reconciliation processes, in order to prevent the resumption of conflict and 
violence in Kenya.’ 
60
 J Sigei, ‘Kenya Launches Fresh Attempt to Block ICC Cases’ The Daily Nation (Nairobi 16 August 
2013) <http://www.nation.co.ke/news/-/1056/1956896/-/qas860/-/index.html> accessed 18 June 2014. 
 17 
cases to a national mechanism, claiming, among other things, that ‘the proceedings of the 
Court on the Kenyan defendants are beginning to adversely affect the ability of the 
Kenyan leaders in discharging their constitutional responsibilities.’61 In a telling instance 
of what Kamari Clarke has termed ‘legal encapsulation’,62 the court responded that the 
request was not recognisable within the ICC’s legal framework.63 The matter was raised 
at the UN General Assembly in late September 2013, where the Ethiopian prime minister 
claimed that the ICC ‘has degenerated into a political instrument targeting Africa’.64 The 
Kenyan government requested an extraordinary summit of the African Union to discuss 
ICC-related issues, which was convened in October 2013 and resulted in a resolution 
asserting that the trials of Kenyatta and Ruto should be suspended until their terms in 
office were completed.
65
 Backed by the African Union, the Kenyan government then 
approached the Security Council for a second time to request an Article 16 deferral. In 
the wake of the attack on the Westgate mall in Nairobi, Kenya argued that a deferral was 
needed ‘to prevent the aggravation of the threat, breach of the peace or act of aggression 
that the terrorism menace poses to national, regional, continental and international peace 
and security’.66 A divided Security Council failed to grant the request, with seven of 
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As noted above, tensions between the ICC and the African Union resurfaced at the annual 
Assembly of States Parties meeting in The Hague in November of 2013.
68
 A number of 
AU states made direct reference to the deferral request in their statements to the general 
assembly. South Africa expressed disappointment that the Security Council did not take 
more time to review the situation before calling for a vote, and Namibia described it as 
‘highly regrettable’.69 Tanzania noted its concern with the growing rift between the court 
and the African continent, and added that a deferral under Article 16 would have helped 
to address these challenges. Speaking on behalf of the African Union, Uganda claimed 
that ‘the Kenyan situation warrants [the] UN Security Council to exercise its mandate 
under Article 16 of the Rome Statute of the ICC read together with Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter to allow Kenya to move forward and deal with the challenges confronting 
it.’70 
 
In response to these claims concerning tensions with African states and the prospect of a 
Kenyan deferral, ICC proponents such as Belgium argued for the integrity of the legal 
process, contending that ‘political time should not interrupt legal time’.71 Meanwhile, 
civil society representatives from Kenya argued that ‘the ICC intervention is a direct 
result and an integral part of an African Union- and Kenyan-initiated process that ended 
the 2008 post-election violence (PEV); it is neither alien to that process, nor a threat to 
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it.’72 A number of civil society proponents contested the claim that the Kenyan situation 
had generated a rift between the court and African states, noting instead the widespread 
support for the court on the continent and maintaining that the ICC’s intervention in 
Kenya was domestically driven rather than an external imposition. These different 
discursive framings reflected broader contestations around whose agency generated the 
ICC intervention in Kenya, and in particular, whether it should be regarded as 
domestically driven or as an external imposition. 
 
Political contestations increasingly transpired through the discourse of state sovereignty 
and its alleged breach. Before the 2013 election, discussions about the relationship 
between the ICC intervention and the Kenyan electoral process had centred on the 
candidates’ qualifications for office under the 2010 constitution’s ‘leadership and 
integrity’ provisions and whether their abilities to run the government and engage in 
diplomacy would be hindered by the cases they needed to answer. Once Kenyatta and 
Ruto won the election, however, the issue of Kenyan sovereignty became a more 
prominent theme. The 2013 Assembly of States Parties annual meeting included a special 
segment, at the request of the African Union, entitled ‘Indictment of Sitting Heads of 
State and Government and its consequences on peace and stability and reconciliation’, 
where some participants appeared to conflate the issuance of summonses for Kenyatta 
and Ruto with the indictment of sitting heads of state.
73
 At Kenyatta’s inauguration 
ceremony in April 2013, President Museveni of Uganda, who had previously supported 
the ICC, noted that ‘the usual opinionated and arrogant actors’ are using the ICC ‘to 
install leaders of their choice in Africa and eliminate the ones they do not like’.74 In May 
2013 Macharia Kamau, the Kenyan representative to the UN, requested ‘termination’ (as 
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opposed to deferral) of proceedings against Kenyan nationals in a confidential letter to 
the Security Council, invoking the sovereign right of UN states and arguing that 
‘Kenyans, in whom this sovereign right rests, spoke with a loud, clear, concise voice 
when they overwhelmingly elected Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto as President and 
Deputy President respectively.’75 Meanwhile, at the AU summit that month, a resolution 
regarding the ICC expressed ‘concern with the misuse of indictments against African 
leaders’.76 Although the resolution was brought by Uganda and South Sudan, Kenya 
circulated an aide memoire claiming that the prosecutor was contradicting the sovereign 
will of the people that had been expressed through the elections.
77
 The Ethiopian Prime 
Minister publicly stated that the ICC process ‘has degenerated into some kind of race 
hunting.’78 In September 2013, Kenyan MPs approved a motion to withdraw from the 
Rome Statute tabled by the Jubilee coalition majority leader, with the intention of 
introducing a bill to this effect. Jubilee majority leader Aden Duale reportedly stated:  
‘Let us protect our citizens. Let us defend the sovereignty of the nation of Kenya.’79  
 
Not only Kenyan sovereignty but the sovereignty of African states more broadly was 
perceived to be under threat, which is in part a product of the ICC’s selective geographies 
of intervention. The form of sovereignty under threat is presented as self-determination 
and freedom from external intervention. The intervener’s identity as the ‘international 
community’ is understood by its critics to be masking other influences – ‘the usual 
opinionated and arrogant actors’, in Museveni’s words, with their civil society conduits 
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that are presumed to be funded by Northern donor states. In this way the work of the ICC 
has become bound up with claims of neocolonialism. 
 
4. Tensions between Civil Society and the Kenyan State 
 
In contestations around the politics of ICC interventions, Kenyan state actors and some 
AU member states and officials have invoked the discourse of sovereignty as part of what 
Clarke and Koulen refer to in this issue as the ‘African Union-ICC push-back’. From the 
standpoint of the Kenyan state, the involvement of civil society organisations with the 
ICC process presented a threat to its sovereignty. According to a member of a prominent 
non-governmental network, a number of Kenyan civil society organisations made the 
clear decision in 2010 to welcome ICC involvement, and donors materially supported this 
decision.
80
 Scholars have noted the historical involvement of Kenyan civil society 
organisations in domestic politics more broadly, an involvement that Karuti Kanyinga 
characterises as ‘non-traditional and non-conventional’ through its role in political 
leadership.
81
 However, this involvement has led to questions about whose interests these 
organisations represent. In a monograph addressing state reform through constitutional 
change subtitled ‘Taming Leviathan’, legal scholar Makau Mutua argued that civil 
society is ‘the only sector that can fundamentally renew the political class’ in Kenya.82 
Elsewhere, however, he has warned of domestic organisations mimicking the narrow 
mandates and standardised objectives of international non-governmental organisations, 
observing that ‘the unhealthy reliance on external, donor funding from the West is the 
biggest threat to the NGO sector in East Africa’. 83  Describing Kenyan civil society 
involvement in the constitutional reform process leading to the 2010 constitution, some 
commentators have claimed that Kenyan civil society was ‘dependent upon donor 
funding, and in subtle ways it became as responsible to donors and their perspectives and 
demands (as well as the demands of donor funding cycles) as it was to the demands of 
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Kenyans they were “representing”’.84 Betty Murungi has pointed out how ‘disillusioned 
citizens placed their trust in civil society organizations’, which led to the Kenyan state 
declaring that ‘NGOs were an unelected nuisance or the agents of foreign interests or 
powers.’85  
 
Kenyan political actors have invoked this historical patron-client relationship between 
foreign funding sources and domestic non-governmental organisations in an attempt to 
discredit their work. Before the election, for example, a prominent international civil 
society organisation was accused of favoring Raila Odinga and the CORD alliance.
86
 At a 
hearing of a case brought before the Kenyan High Court challenging Kenyatta’s and 
Ruto’s eligibility to run for office based on ethics and integrity provisions of the 2010 
constitution, Kenyatta’s legal representative argued that these cases were backed by 
Northern donors: ‘All the petitions have been filed by individuals and organisations that 
are interrelated and whose source of funding is primarily the Open Society of America 
and whose objective is to disrupt our democratic processes and whose objective is aimed 
at whipping the sentiments of the people of Kenya against a candidate or candidates.’87 
Meanwhile, a Kenyan government official claimed that civil society organisations are 





What this narrative of civil society organisations as materially dependent proxies of 
foreign interests effaces, however, is the degree to which some civil society alignments 
were domestic initiatives forged as a response to the post-election violence. The 
influential Kenyans for Peace, Truth and Justice (KPTJ) coalition emerged during this 
time. The non-governmental sector in Kenya is considerably more autonomous and 
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established than in other states of the region.
89
 Civil society in Kenya is heterogeneous, 
with much variation in degrees of donor dependence. Yet efforts by state actors to 
discredit the work of organisations and individuals have presented Kenyan civil society 
as a homogeneous field subject to foreign influence. The ‘UK dossier’ affair of 2012 is 
one such example, where three prominent activists were called before a parliamentary 
committee to explain the nature of their connections to the ICC on the suspicion that they 
were collaborating with the British government to have then-president Kibaki appear 
before the court after he left office. John Githongo, one of the accused activists, later 
noted that ‘[d]uring the election campaigns earlier this year, a virulent and effective 
propaganda onslaught against the ‘evil/civil society’ was rolled out’.90 The phrase ‘evil 
society’ was introduced into the Kenyan political vocabulary, supplementing the criticism 
of civil society actors as foreign proxies with a moral condemnation of their work. In pre- 
and post-2013 election political discourse in Kenya, the sovereignty of the Kenyan state 
was presented as being under threat from external forces and their presumptive conduits 
at the domestic level. 
 
As an extension of its efforts to contest the ICC presence in country, the Kenyan state has 
also opposed practices of civil society organisations that support the court’s work. There 
were varying degrees of collaboration between the ICC, foreign (donor) states, and civil 
society networks. Before the election, for example, court actors relied upon their civil 
society partners to raise questions about whether the suspects were fit to run for office 
under the integrity provisions of the 2010 constitution. Some organisations within the 
KPTJ network have collaborated with the ICC on activities such as community outreach, 
identifying potential victim participants, and facilitating interfaces between their 
constituents and court actors. In the period preceding the election and in the following 
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months, donor state representatives, international and domestic civil society members, 
and in-country ICC staff expressed the need to maintain a low profile, particularly in 
sensitive areas such as the Rift Valley.
91
  Meanwhile, attempts to amend the Public 
Benefit Organisation Act to cap foreign funding for NGOs at 15% of their budget were 
regarded by some observers as a result of negative perceptions of the ICC intervention in 




The convergent discourses of Kenyan state sovereignty and the perceived threat of 
neocolonialism have attracted the attention of court actors. Despite deliberate efforts to 
maintain a sharp distinction between law and politics, the politicisation of the court’s 
work in the Kenyan context has led some of its staff to engage more directly with these 
claims in an effort to develop counter-discourses and strategies. After the start dates for 
the trials were postponed for a second time in June 2013, contributing to a sense among 
some Kenyans that the court had been weakened, the ICC’s Outreach program engaged in 
a series of consultative meetings with civil society organisations, journalists and 
‘intermediaries’ in Kenya to attempt to develop new approaches to mitigate 
misperceptions of the Court’s work and gain support for its judicial activities.93 An ICC 
spokesperson opening the meeting stated that ‘in this context the ICC has become a 
political issue – it is part of the political discourse’. A representative from the court’s 
Outreach Unit noted that the court had been perceived as a ‘neocolonial tool’, which 
required new strategies to counter this narrative. Participants expressed that the language 
of victimhood was being appropriated by the suspects, who claimed that they had been 
unfairly targeted by the ICC and were thus ‘victims’ of the court’s interventions. One 
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participant claimed that the ICC ‘has let the other side shape the narrative that it is a 
Western imposition,’ and added, ‘it is a powerful narrative that has played very well’.94 
 
The Court’s Office of the Prosecutor has also begun to publicly acknowledge the 
politicisation of the trials in Kenya. Referencing the AU resolution of May 2013, one 
filing noted that ‘[t]he Prosecution believes that the combined effect of this resolution 
and related media reports in the Kenyan press have served to further rally Kenyans 
against the Court by fostering the perception that the Court is a foreign entity that was 
imposed on Kenya by illegitimate, western, interests.’ 95  At the opening of the case 
against Ruto and Sang, ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda addressed these perceptions 
directly:  
This is not a trial of Kenya or the Kenyan people. It is not about 
vindicating or indicating – indicting one or other ethnic group or political 
party. It is not about meddling in African affairs. This trial, Mr President, 
Your Honors, is about obtaining justice for the many thousands of victims 
of the post-election violence and ensuring that there is no impunity for 




As a rhetorical tactic, critics of the ICC intervention seek to substitute the individuals on 
trial for a broader entity – either the communities they are seen to represent or the 
Kenyan state. For example, in his opening statement on behalf of his client Joshua Arap 
Sang, Joseph Kigen-Katwa claimed that it was not his client but rather the Kalenjin 
community that was on trial: ‘it becomes very clear and apparent that what is on trial are 
not individuals. It is actually a community and its culture’.97 Court proponents respond 
within the liberal counter-discourse of individual accountability:  in the words of the 
prosecutor above, by ‘ensuring that there is no impunity for those responsible’. For 
example, members of the Coalition for the ICC (CICC) argued that 
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By using the weight of the government to argue its case before the 
Security Council based on some vague, illusory threat that amounts to an 
extra-judicial request for impunity, Kenya’s political elite is seeking to 
frame the ICC as having put the entire Kenyan state in the dock, rather 
than select individuals alleged to be responsible for the worst of the crimes 




The claims of ICC critics take for granted that Kenyatta and Ruto stand metonymically 
for a larger entity under threat – either their respective communities or Kenyan 
sovereignty. For ICC proponents, this is a manipulative category mistake – putting ‘the 
entire Kenyan state in the dock’ – whereas other African states and the African Union 




It is by democratic reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
that one tries, most often to no avail, to impose limits on the sovereignty of 
nation-states. One example of this, among so many others, would be the 




The ‘political dream’ 100  of international judicial intervention harbours an internal 
contradiction of the kind that the poststructuralist philosopher Jacques Derrida illustrates 
above. The ‘democratic reference’ to a cosmopolitan ideal of law and legal institutions 
exists in tension with the principle of state sovereignty, compounded by the latter’s 
substantial normative value for post-colonial states. The ICC’s intervention in Kenya 
relies upon a legal ontology that privileges individual accountability while sidelining 
other values in practice, including other liberal legalist norms such as political transitions 
through peaceful elections. The Leviathan of ‘UhuRuto’ – a political identity produced 
from the ICC intervention – in turn led to an effective (if tenuous) suspension of conflict 
between the Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities in the 2013 electoral cycle. Yet this weak 
alliance, forged from opposition to the court, may unravel depending upon the outcome 
                                                        
98
 Stephen Lamony and Sunil Pal, ‘Politicizing the ICC Process in Kenya Will Not Let ICC Suspects off 
the Hook’ (Blog post at African Arguments 22 May 2013) 
<http://africanarguments.org/2013/05/22/politicizing-the-icc-process-in-kenya-will-not-let-icc-suspects-off-
the-hook-by-stephen-lamony-sunil-pal/> accessed 18 June 2014. 
99
 Jacques Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason (Stanford University Press, Stanford 2005), 87. 
100
 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison (Vintage Books, New York 1977), 198. 
 27 
of the cases. As one civil society representative noted, The Hague represents ‘the life 
blood of their coalition’; another commented that ‘all is not going well in this coalition’, 




In addition to unsettling and reconfiguring political identities and alliances, another effect 
of the ICC intervention in Kenya has been the appropriation of narratives of victimhood 
by political actors. Such assertions divert attention from the harm suffered by conflict-
affected communities, enabling these actors to channel political interests through claims 
regarding their own victimisation. At the final pre-trial status conference, for example, 
Deputy President William Ruto made the following statement:  
the circumstances surrounding these matters has produced two sets of victims, 
which I am very passionate about. Post-election violence victims, whose lives and 
property were destroyed and deserve justice and truth, and another set of victims, 
which I belong to. Victims of a syndicate of falsehood, and a conspiracy of lies 




Many members of Kenyan civil society organisations pointed out that the language of 
victimhood was deployed by the suspects rather than directed toward the ongoing 
suffering of internally displaced people. This produced a strategic effort by the ICC and 
its civil society proponents to reclaim the terms through which victimhood is understood, 
as when the Prosecutor addressed criticisms of the ICC as an affront to African 
sovereignty by invoking ‘the many thousands of victims of the post-election violence’ in 
response.
103
 The ICC’s work in Kenya also reinforced the demands for legal 
accountability among domestic political actors. As the coordinator of a civil society 
network observed, ‘if we didn’t have the ICC perhaps then there wouldn’t be as much 
discourse about post-election violence in the political arena.’104 In this sense the ICC’s 
work produces sites of discursive contestation in addition to disseminating the terms of 
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international criminal law – shifting political narratives, fostering counter-claims, and 
producing a new rhetorical arena where issues of sovereignty, neocolonialism, and elite 
impunity are asserted and contested. 
 
Although its broader impact upon conflict-affected communities remains unclear, the 
ICC’s intervention has clearly reconfigured domestic politics within Kenya. It produced a 
political alliance forged out of opposition to the court through the figure of ‘UhuRuto’. 
This international judicial intervention introduced a new, shared enemy (the court itself) 
into the Kenyan political order that appeared to displace past forms of enmity between 
communities. Furthermore, the ICC’s intervention in Kenya led to greater state 
mobilisation against civil society organisations, which were depicted as the neocolonial 
trace or space of Western influence. Whether or not the ICC intervention constituted a 
form of neocolonialism seemed less a matter than how to direct the popular narrative 
toward particular political ends. It has also led to increased tensions between the court 
and the African Union, with political contestations playing out through the language of 
sovereignty. The court’s intervention in Kenya may have contributed to producing its 
own enemy, in the sense that UhuRuto – forged out of shared opposition to the court – 
appears to pose an existential threat to the ICC, as African leaders and the African Union 
mobilise around the claim of neocolonialism and threats to African sovereignty and self-
determination. 
 
Finally, the ICC’s work in Kenya has produced further UN Security Council involvement 
with the court, reminding states parties and court critics of the Council’s exceptional 
position within an otherwise consent-driven Rome Statute system. Even through the 
Security Council’s decisions not to grant an Article 16 deferral, which might be read as a 
form of restraint and unwillingness to interfere in the workings of the ICC, the force of 
political concessions and compromise from which the ICC emerged are made clear. For 
in declining to grant the request made by Kenya and backed by the AU, the Security 
Council reinscribes its own (sovereign) authority to determine the workings of a system 
that some of its members remain outside. What the Kenyan situation has produced, in 
 29 
effect, is a more overt politicisation of the ICC’s work, where the interrelationships 
between the juridical and the political are rendered increasingly visible. 
